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Crime and Punishment:
Considering Prison Disciplinary
Sanctions as Grounds for Departure
Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Madison Peace *
Abstract
There are currently over 175,000 federal inmates in the
United States, 146,000 of whom are held in custody by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons. When an inmate in federal prison
commits a federal crime, he can be both sanctioned by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons and referred to a United States
Attorney for prosecution of the crime in federal district court. In
the federal district court, a judge will look to the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines as a starting point to determine an appropriate
sentence.
One question that the U.S. Sentencing Commission has not
addressed, and on which federal appellate courts are divided, is
whether prison disciplinary sanctions can be used as bases for
downward departure under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
when inmates are prosecuted in federal courts for crimes they
committed while incarcerated. This Note will consider that
question and will then recommend that the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines be explicitly amended to include prison disciplinary
sanctions as grounds for departure.
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“If he has a conscience, he will suffer for his mistake. That will
be punishment—as well as the prison.”
Fyodor Dostoevsky,
Crime and Punishment
I. Introduction
A. Consider This: A Federal Sentencing Hypothetical
Consider the following situation. James is serving a
three-year sentence in federal prison for selling one hundred
pounds of marijuana. 1 He has been the subject of several
derogatory remarks from fellow prisoners. One day, a prison
guard makes an offhand remark that offends James. He loses
his temper and strikes the guard in the face, giving him a black
eye. James immediately apologizes to the guard. James’s action
is considered a “high severity level prohibited act” under federal
regulations. 2 After going through a hearing process in his
correctional facility, James loses visitation and communication
privileges for three months and is thus unable to see or speak
with his young daughter. 3 Additionally, he is moved to a
different housing unit within the prison. Because the incident
also qualifies as a federal offense, 4 the Bureau of Prisons refers
it to a U.S. Attorney’s Office for potential prosecution. 5 The U.S.
Attorney decides to prosecute James, and James pleads guilty
to the offense of assault.
Prior to sentencing, a probation officer calculates the
appropriate sentencing range for James under the U.S.
1.
See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2018) (describing the federal offenses of
distributing controlled and counterfeit substances and the penalties
associated with such offenses).
2.
See 28 C.F.R. § 541.3 (2018) (describing acts prohibited within federal
prisons and the sanctions associated with committing such acts).
3.
See id. § 541.5 (setting forth the disciplinary process in federal
prisons).
4.
See 18 U.S.C. § 111 (2018) (setting forth the offense of “[a]ssaulting,
resisting, or impeding certain officers or employees”).
5.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, No. 1350.01, PROGRAM STATEMENT:
CRIMINAL MATTER REFERRALS (1996) (outlining procedures for “tracking and
referring matters for prosecution that occur in Bureau of Prisons facilities or
on Bureau of Prisons property, or involve Bureau of Prisons staff”).
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Sentencing Guidelines. 6 Combining a base offense level of 14 for
“aggravated assault,” 7 the specific offense characteristic of
causing the guard bodily injury, 8 and adjustments based upon
the fact that the guard was a government employee 9 and that
James accepted responsibility for his action, 10 the probation
officer calculates James’s final offense level at 20. 11 Although
James’s criminal record includes only one other conviction,
which is for selling marijuana, because James committed the
instant offense while serving a sentence, he earns two criminal
history points. 12 This places him in Criminal History Category
II. 13 Based upon his offense level (20) and his criminal history
category (II), the applicable sentencing range for James’s
offense is thirty-seven to forty-six months. 14 The probation
officer puts this information, along with James’s prison
disciplinary history, in her report. 15
In federal district court, the judge considers the report but
then decides to give James a sentence of only nine months, to be
served consecutively with the sentence he is currently serving.
The judge states that he is departing from the
guidelines-recommended sentence, because he believes that the
6.
See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41697, HOW THE
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES WORK: AN ABRIDGED OVERVIEW 1 (2015)
(explaining in detail how the guidelines work).
7.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A2.2 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018) (describing the base offense level and specific offense
characteristics for aggravated assault).
8.
See id. (listing “bodily injury” as a factor for increasing the offense
level).
9.
See id. § 3A1.2 (setting forth the necessary adjustments when the
victim is an “official victim,” such as a government employee).
10.
See id. § 3E1.1 (setting forth the necessary adjustments for when a
defendant accepts responsibility for his offense).
11.
See § 1B1.1 (providing instructions for applying the guidelines).
12.
See § 4A1.1 (setting forth the criminal history categories and the
points associated with them).
13.
See § 5A (setting forth the sentencing table used to determine the
applicable sentencing range based upon a defendant’s offense level and
criminal history category).
14.
See id. (providing the sentencing ranges “in months of
imprisonment”).
15.
See DOYLE, supra note 6, at 1 (explaining in detail how the guidelines
work).
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disciplinary sanctions James received from the Bureau of
Prisons make a guidelines-calculated sentence too harsh.
There are currently over 175,000 federal inmates in the
United States, 146,000 of whom are held in Bureau of Prisons
custody. 16 As illustrated above in the hypothetical involving the
fictional James, when an inmate in federal prison commits a
federal crime, he can be both sanctioned by the Federal Bureau
of Prisons and referred to a United States Attorney for
prosecution of the crime in federal district court. 17 In the federal
district court, a judge will look to the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines as a starting point to determine an appropriate
sentence. 18
B. Prison Disciplinary Sanctions as Grounds for Downward
Departure: An Unresolved Issue
In October 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform
Act as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. 19
With the goal of making the federal sentencing system more
proportional and consistent, the Sentencing Reform Act
abolished federal parole for most cases and established the U.S.
Sentencing Commission as an independent agency of the
judicial branch. 20 Congress tasked the Commission with
promulgating the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines to reduce judicial
discretion in federal courts by providing sentencing policies and

16.
See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, STATISTICS, https://www.bop.gov/about
/statistics/population_statistics.jsp (last visited Apr. 30, 2020) (providing
updated data on the federal inmate population each Thursday) [https://
perma.cc/5QDU-BE6A].
17.
See PROGRAM STATEMENT: CRIMINAL MATTER REFERRALS, supra note 5
(outlining procedures for “tracking and referring matters for prosecution that
occur in Bureau of Prisons facilities or on Bureau of Prisons property, or
involve Bureau of Prisons staff”).
18.
See DOYLE, supra note 6, at 1 (explaining in detail how the guidelines
work).
19.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2018) (setting forth the provisions of the
Sentencing Reform Act).
20.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.2 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018) (setting forth the statutory mission of the U.S. Sentencing
Commission).
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practices based upon empirical data. 21 In 1987, the Commission
published its first guidelines manual. 22 The guidelines were
mandatory and binding on sentencing judges until 2005 when
the Supreme Court held in United States v. Booker 23 that an
application of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines violated a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. 24 In light of
the Court’s decision in Booker, the guidelines are now
“effectively advisory.” 25 Even though the sections of the
Sentencing Reform Act making the guidelines mandatory have
been severed, the Act still “requires judges to take account of the
Guidelines together with other sentencing goals.” 26 District
courts must “consult” the guidelines, even though they are “not
bound to apply” them. 27 Sentences that fall within the
guidelines range, however, may enjoy a presumption of
reasonableness upon appellate review. 28
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines allow for courts to exercise
discretion and depart from the suggested sentencing range
based upon a number of factors explicitly addressed within the
guidelines in various places—in commentary and policy
statements in Chapters Two, Four, and Five. 29 The Commission
has also made it clear that it “does not intend to limit the kinds

21.
22.

Id.
See id. (noting that the “Commission’s initial guidelines were
submitted to Congress on April 13, 1987”).
23.
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (holding that
the Sixth Amendment requires “juries, not judges, to find facts relevant to
sentencing” and severing the provision of the federal sentencing statute
making the guidelines mandatory).
24.
Id.
25.
Id.
26.
Id. at 259.
27.
Id. at 264.
28.
See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007) (concluding that a
“court of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court
sentence that reflects a proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines”)
(emphasis added).
29.
See NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY 159–60
(Wolters Kluwer 4th ed. 2018) (explaining that commentary in Chapter Two
of the guidelines provides “offense-specific bases for departures,” Chapter Four
provides grounds for criminal history departures, and policy statements in
Chapter Five provide “generic bases for departure”).
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of factors, whether or not mentioned anywhere else in the
[G]uidelines, that could constitute grounds for departure . . . .” 30
One question that the U.S. Sentencing Commission has not
addressed, and on which federal appellate courts are divided, is
whether prison disciplinary sanctions can be used as bases for
downward departure under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
when inmates are prosecuted in federal courts for crimes they
committed while incarcerated. 31 This Note will consider that
question and will then recommend that the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines be explicitly amended to include prison disciplinary
sanctions as grounds for departure.
II. An Overview of Federal Sentencing
A. The Development of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created the U.S.
Sentencing Commission and tasked it with promulgating and
distributing guidelines for federal courts. 32 The guidelines were
developed to create a more effective, fair, honest, uniform, and
proportional sentencing system that would further the “basic
purposes of criminal punishment: deterrence, incapacitation,
just punishment, and rehabilitation.” 33 Under the relevant
statutory provision, when imposing a criminal sentence, courts
are to consider seven factors:
1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant;
2) the need for the sentence imposed . . . ;
3) the kinds of sentences available;
4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established
for—(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the

30.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.4(b) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018).
31.
See id. § 5K (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (listing the grounds for
departure but not including prison disciplinary sanctions).
32.
See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2018) (describing the duties of the U.S.
Sentencing Commission).
33.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018).
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applicable category of defendant as set forth in the
guidelines . . . ;
5) any pertinent policy statement—(A) issued by the
Sentencing Commission . . . ;
6) the need to avoid unwanted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty
of similar conduct; and
7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the
offense. 34

Under what is called the parsimony clause, sentencing
courts are to “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes [of sentencing,]” which
include promoting respect for the law, providing just
punishment, deterring criminal conduct, protecting the public,
and providing the defendant with “needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner . . . .” 35 In pursuing this
end, courts are to look to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which
set forth categories of offense behavior and characteristics and
corresponding sentencing ranges. 36
B. How to Calculate a Sentence Under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines
Federal courts sentence defendants after conviction or
pursuant to a plea agreement. 37 The guidelines are the “starting
point” for sentencing. 38 Generally, before a sentencing hearing,
a probation officer conducts a presentence investigation and
prepares a presentence report, 39 which includes factual
34.
35.
36.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018).
Id.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018) (setting forth the statutory mission of the U.S. Sentencing
Commission); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2018) (granting authority to the U.S.
Sentencing Commission to promulgate and distribute sentencing guidelines
for use in federal criminal cases).
37.
See DOYLE, supra note 6, at 1 (explaining in detail how the guidelines
work).
38.
Id.
39.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1)(A) (explaining that a presentence
investigation and report are required unless a statute requires otherwise or
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information and a guidelines calculation for the court to
consider. 40 The prosecution and defense are both given the
opportunity to respond to the calculation. 41 In determining a
sentence, the judge takes into account the guidelines range, the
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and “other applicable
statutory demands,” such as mandatory minimum
requirements. 42 The court is to “impose a sentence sufficient,
but not greater than necessary, to comply with” the purposes of
sentencing. 43
Section 1B1.1 of the guidelines provides general application
instructions for federal courts. 44 The guidelines are to be applied
in the following way: First, the probation officer determines
what guideline in Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) 45 of the
guidelines is “applicable to the offense of conviction.” 46 In order
to do this, she looks to the Statutory Index, 47 which lists all the
federal crime statutes and the corresponding Chapter Two
sections. 48 The applicable Chapter Two section guides the officer
to determine a Chapter Two offense level by combining the “base
offense level” with “specific offense characteristics.” 49 The officer
the “court finds that the information in the record enables it to meaningfully
exercise its sentencing authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3553, and the court
explains its finding on the record”).
40.
See DOYLE, supra note 6, at 1 (explaining in detail how the guidelines
work).
41.
See id. at 6 (noting that both sides “may object to any of [the report’s]
provisions or omissions”).
42.
Id. at 1, 6.
43.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018).
44.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018) (describing in detail the order in which the provisions of the
guidelines are to be imposed).
45.
See id. § 2 (categorizing various offenses).
46.
Id. § 1B1.1(a)(1).
47.
See id. at app. A (providing the Statutory Index).
48.
See id. § 1B1.1(a)(2) (describing the second step in applying the
guidelines).
49.
Id. Consider an example relating to the hypothetical at the beginning
of this note. Section 2A2.2 of the guidelines covers “aggravated assault,” which
has a Base Offense Level of 14. Id. § 2A2.2. Section 2A2.2 lists several “Specific
Offense Characteristics.” Id. If the “assault involved more than minimal
planning,” for example, the probation officer increases the offense level by two
levels. Id. If the assault resulted in “bodily injury,” the probation officer

800

26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 791 (2020)

then turns to Chapter Three to consider any adjustments. 50
Adjustments can relate to the victim, 51 the defendant’s role in
the offense, 52 obstruction of justice, 53 whether the defendant has
been convicted of multiple counts, 54 and whether the defendant
has accepted responsibility for his actions. 55 By combining the
Chapter Two offense level with the adjustments, the officer
finds the defendant’s final offense level. 56 There are forty-three
final offense levels. 57
Next, the officer calculates a defendant’s criminal history
points to determine which of six criminal history categories
applies to his criminal record. 58 Criminal history points are
assigned based upon prior convictions and whether the
defendant committed the offense while serving a sentence for
another offense. 59 By looking at the final offense level and
criminal history category, as well as any applicable departure
provisions, the probation officer determines the applicable

increases the offense level by three levels, and if it resulted in “serious bodily
injury,” she increases it by five levels. Id.
50.
See id. § 1B1.1(a)(3) (describing the third step in applying the
guidelines).
51.
See id. § 3A (setting forth “victim-related adjustments,” such as
“restraint of victim”).
52.
See id. § 3B (setting forth “role in the offense” adjustments, such as
“aggravating role” and “mitigating role”).
53.
See id. § 3C (setting forth “obstruction and related adjustments,” such
as “reckless endangerment during flight”).
54.
See id. § 3D (setting forth instructions on adjusting the sentencing
calculation based upon defendant being convicted of more than one count).
55.
See id. § 3E (setting forth instructions on adjusting the sentencing
calculation based upon defendant accepting responsibility for his or her
offense).
56.
See id. § 1B1.1(a)(1)–(7) (setting forth all the steps for determining
the final offense level).
57.
See id. § 5A (setting forth the sentencing table used to determine the
applicable sentencing range based upon a defendant’s offense level and
criminal history category).
58.
See DOYLE, supra note 6, at 1 (explaining in detail how the guidelines
work).
59.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018) (setting forth the number of points assigned for criminal
history).
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sentencing range from the Sentencing Table. 60 The judge is
required to consider the range presented in the probation
report. 61
C. Departures and Variances from Guidelines-Recommended
Sentencing
When the guidelines were first instituted in 1987, they were
mandatory, requiring courts to select sentences from guideline
ranges. 62 Now, the guidelines are “effectively advisory,” 63 which
means courts are required to consider the guidelines but are
allowed to impose a non-guidelines sentence if the judge sees
fit. 64 With a few exceptions, courts may consider “without
limitation, any information concerning the background,
character and conduct of the defendant” in deciding whether or
not to impose a sentence outside the guidelines range. 65 Courts
may impose non-guidelines sentences through both departures
and variances. 66
A departure is the “imposition of a sentence outside the
applicable guideline range or of a sentence that is otherwise

60.
See DOYLE, supra note 6, at 4 (discussing how sentences are
determined).
61.
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
delivering the opinion of the Court in part) (“So modified, the federal
sentencing statute . . . requires a sentencing court to consider guidelines
ranges . . . but it permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other
statutory concerns as well.”).
62.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018) (explaining how the original guidelines worked).
63.
Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46; see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 49 (2007) (stating that the “Guidelines should be the starting point and the
initial benchmark” but that they are “not the only consideration”).
64.
See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007) (“The sentencing
courts, applying the Guidelines in individual cases may depart (either
pursuant to the Guidelines or, since Booker, by imposing a non-Guidelines
sentence).”).
65.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.4 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018).
66.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PRIMER: DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES 1
(2018) (describing the general principles by which sentencing courts are to
abide when considering imposing a sentence outside the guidelines range).
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different from the guideline sentence . . . .” 67 The guidelines
have always allowed for departures from the prescribed
sentencing range under certain circumstances. 68 A variance, in
contrast, is the imposition of a sentence outside the guideline
range based upon the statutory sentencing factors and the
instruction in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 69 to “impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply” with the
purposes of sentencing. 70 These purposes include accounting for
the “seriousness of the offense,” promoting “respect for the law,”
providing “just punishment,” deterring criminal conduct,
protecting the “public from further crimes of the defendant,” and
providing the “defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the
most effective manner.” 71 In practice, there is a great deal of
overlap between the reasons courts give when they grant a
departure from the guidelines range and those they give when
they grant a variance from the guidelines range. 72 Courts grant
departures based upon factors the guidelines themselves
anticipate or because a factor takes the case out of the

67.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A, n.1(F) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018).
68.
See id. § 1A1.4(b) (explaining the reasons for the Commission’s
departure policy and the kinds of departures the guidelines allow).
69.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018) (instructing federal courts on how to
impose sentences).
70.
Id.; see also PRIMER: DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES, supra note 66
(describing the general principles by which sentencing courts are to abide
when considering imposing a sentence outside the guidelines range).
71.
§ 3553(a).
72.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REASONS GIVEN BY SENTENCING COURTS
FOR SENTENCES BELOW THE GUIDELINE RANGE WITH BOOKER/18 U.S.C. § 3553
(2017),
https://isb.ussc.gov/api/repos/:USSC:table_xx.xcdf
/generatedContent?table_num=Table25B (last visited Apr. 30, 2020)
(compiling the reasons for which sentencing courts have stated they are giving
a sentence below the guidelines range, citing Booker and § 3553
considerations) [https://perma.cc/6QQT-A8XT]; see also U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, REASONS GIVEN BY SENTENCING COURTS FOR DOWNWARD DEPARTURES
FROM THE GUIDELINE RANGE (2017), https://isb.ussc.gov/api/repos/:USSC:table
_xx.xcdf/generatedContent?table_num=Table25 (last visited Apr. 30, 2020)
(compiling the reasons for which sentencing courts have stated they are
departing from the guidelines range) [https://perma.cc/H583-6LFE].
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“heartland” of cases the guidelines were meant to cover. 73
Variances focus on whether the sentence achieves the goals of
sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553. 74
Sentencing in a federal district court is a three-step process.
First, the court considers the guidelines sentencing range. 75
Then the court considers whether any of the departure
provisions of the guidelines apply. 76 Finally, the court considers
the §3553(a) factors “as a whole” and determines whether it
should grant a variance. 77
1. Types of Departures
There are two types of departure allowed for under the
guidelines: departures for which the guidelines “provide specific
guidance . . . by analogy or by other numerical or non-numerical
suggestions” and “unguided” departures. 78

73.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.4(b) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018); see also United States v. Rangel, 697 F.3d 795, 801 (9th Cir.
2012) (“A ‘departure’ is typically a change from the final sentencing range
computed by examining the provisions of the Guidelines themselves.”).
74.
See PRIMER: DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES, supra note 66 (describing
the general principles by which sentencing courts are to abide when
considering imposing a sentence outside the guidelines range); see also
REASONS GIVEN BY SENTENCING COURTS FOR SENTENCES BELOW THE GUIDELINE
RANGE WITH BOOKER/18 U.S.C. § 3553, supra note 72 (compiling the reasons for
which sentencing courts have stated they are giving a sentence below the
guidelines range, citing Booker and § 3553 considerations). Top reasons courts
have given for sentencing below the guideline range under Booker and § 3553
include “[t]he history and characteristics of the defendant pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),” “[r]eflect seriousness of offense/promotes respect for law
/just punishment,” “[a]fford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” “[t]he
nature and circumstances of the offense pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),”
and “[c]riminal history issues.” Id.
75.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (instructing courts to “determine the kinds of
sentences and the guideline range as set forth in the guidelines”).
76.
See id. § 1B1.1(b) (instructing courts to consider the departure
provisions in Chapter Five and “any other policy statements or commentary
in the [G]uidelines that might warrant consideration in imposing a sentence”).
77.
Id. § 1B1.1(c).
78.
Id. § 1A1.4(b).
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The commentary in Chapter Two 79 and the policy
statements of Chapter Four 80 of the guidelines cover the first
type of departure. The policy statements of Chapter Five cover
the second, more generic type of departure. 81 Examples of
“unguided” departures include the “victim’s conduct,” whether
“coercion and duress” were involved, a defendant’s “aberrant
behavior,” whether “extreme psychological injury” was caused,
whether “property damage or loss” occurred, and “public
welfare.” 82 The list of departures in Chapter Five’s policy
statements is not exhaustive. 83
After considering the two types of departures—those set out
in statements in the guidelines themselves and “unguided”
departures—judges are to look at the sentencing factors set out
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and consider whether issuing a sentence
within the range suggested by the guidelines achieves the
purposes of sentencing, keeping in mind the parsimony clause,
which instructs courts to “impose a sentence that is sufficient,
but not greater than necessary” to comply with the purposes of
sentencing as set forth in § 3553(a)(2). 84
79.
See, e.g., id. § 2A1.1. cmt. n.2(B) (stating that downward departure
for felony murder may be warranted when defendant did not cause the death
intentionally or knowingly).
80.
See, e.g., id. § 4A1.3(b)(1) (“If reliable information indicates that the
defendant’s criminal history category substantially over-represents the
seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the
defendant will commit other crimes, a downward departure may be
warranted.”).
81.
See id. § 5K (presenting grounds for departure based upon
“substantial assistance to the authorities” as well as numerous other grounds
for departure).
82.
Id.
83.
See id. §1A1.4(b) (“While Chapter Five, Part K, lists factors the
Commission believes may constitute grounds for departure, the list is not
exhaustive.”).
84.
See DEMLEITNER, supra note 29, at 160 (explaining departures and
variances under the guidelines); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2018)
(explaining the various needs a sentence might address). The statutory
provision states that the sentence imposed should “reflect the seriousness of
the offense,” “promote respect for the law,” “provide just punishment for the
offense,” “afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” “protect the public
from further crimes of the defendant,” and “provide the defendant with needed
educational and vocational training, medical care, and other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner.” Id.
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Departures can be downward or upward. 85 A downward
departure is when the court “effects a sentence less than a
sentence that could be imposed under the applicable g]uideline
range or a sentence that is otherwise less than the guideline
sentence.” 86 An upward departure is when the court “effects a
sentence greater than a sentence that could be imposed under
the applicable guideline range or a sentence that is otherwise
greater than the guideline sentence.” 87 Grounds for departure
can be raised by the defense, the prosecution, and the court sua
sponte. 88 There are two special instances in which the
prosecution must ask for downward departure by raising a
motion: when a defendant has provided “substantial assistance
in the investigation or prosecution of another person” 89 and
when the defendant has participated in an “early disposition”
program 90 that has been authorized by the Attorney General
and U.S. Attorney in the district in which the defendant resides
or in which the crime has been committed. 91 These types of
prosecutorial departures occur in approximately a quarter of
federal cases. 92
2. The Purpose of Departure Provisions
The U.S. Sentencing Commission adopted a policy allowing
departure for two reasons. 93 First, the Commission recognized
85.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A, n.1(F) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (defining “departure” as used in the guidelines).
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
88.
See DEMLEITNER, supra note 29, at 160 (explaining departures and
variances under the guidelines).
89.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018).
90.
Id. § 5K3.1.
91.
See DEMLEITNER, supra note 29, at 160 (explaining departures and
variances under the guidelines); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 18 (requiring,
generally, that the government prosecute offenses in the district in which they
were committed).
92.
See DEMLEITNER, supra note 29, at 160 (explaining departures and
variances under the guidelines).
93.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.4(b) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (explaining the reasons for the Commission’s
departure policy and the kinds of departures the guidelines allow).
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that the guidelines could not capture the “vast range of human
conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing decision” and that
the guidelines could evolve over time to incorporate
circumstances not originally set forth in them after the
Commission had the opportunity to analyze courts’ decisions to
depart. 94 Second, the Commission did not believe that courts
would depart often and trusted that when they did, they would
do so because the case was “atypical,” one to which a “guideline
linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs
from the norm” and in which a “mechanical application of the
guidelines would fail to achieve the statutory purposes and
goals of sentencing.” 95 While all sentences are considered by
appellate courts under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard,” 96 appellate courts may give sentences that fall within
the calculated guidelines range a presumption of
reasonableness under the Supreme Court’s decision in Rita v.
United States. 97 In that case, the Court explained:
[T]he presumption reflects the fact that, by the time an
appeals court is considering a within-Guidelines sentence on
review, both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing
Commission will have reached the same conclusion as to the
proper sentence in the particular case. That double
determination significantly increases the likelihood that the
sentence is a reasonable one . . . . 98

94.
95.
96.

Id.
See id. § 5, cmt. 5 (explaining the “integral function” departures play).
See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007) (“[C]ourts of appeals
must review all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly
outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.”).
97.
See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 341 (2007) (holding that the
law permits courts of appeals to “presume that a sentence imposed within a
properly calculated United States Sentencing Guidelines range is a reasonable
sentence”).
98.
Id. at 347.
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The Fourth, 99 Fifth, 100 Sixth, 101 Seventh, 102 Eighth, 103
Tenth, 104 and District of Columbia 105 Circuits have adopted the
presumption of reasonableness allowed by Rita. The First, 106

99.
See United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2005)
(explaining that district courts have “some latitude to tailor a particular
sentence to the circumstances” but agreeing with the Seventh Circuit that
sentences calculated within the guidelines range are “presumptively
reasonable”).
100.
See United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006)
(agreeing with its sister circuits that a “sentence within a properly calculated
Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable”).
101.
See United States v. Smith, 881 F.3d 954, 960 (6th Cir. 2018) (stating
that in order for a defendant to show that his sentence was “substantively
unreasonable,” he would need to “overcome a rebuttable presumption that it
was reasonable” because it fell within the guidelines range).
102.
See United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005)
(concluding that post-Booker, the “best way to express the new balance . . . is
to acknowledge that any sentence that is properly calculated under the
Guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness”).
103.
See United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005)
(holding that a sentence within range for offense and criminal history levels
was “presumptively reasonable”).
104.
See United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1053–54 (10th Cir. 2006)
(concluding that a “sentence that is properly calculated under the Guidelines
is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness” in light of the
Guidelines purpose to “‘promote uniformity’” (quoting United States v.
Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 738 (10th Cir. 2005)).
105.
See United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 376 (D.C.C. 2006) (“We
agree with our sister circuits that a sentence within a properly calculated
Guidelines range is entitled to a presumption of reasonableness.”).
106.
See United States v. Ayala-Vazquez, 751 F.3d 1, 47 (1st Cir. 2014)
(declining to adopt a presumption of reasonableness “although the Supreme
Court has explicitly given us the authority to apply this presumption of
reasonableness”).
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Second, 107 Third, 108 Ninth, 109 and Eleventh 110 Circuits have
declined to adopt the presumption of reasonableness. 111
Although the latter circuits have declined to adopt the
presumption of reasonableness, “a Guidelines sentence will
normally not be found unreasonable on appeal.” 112 In the fourth
quarter of 2019, 75.1 percent of sentences fell under the
guidelines, with 51.5 percent falling within the guideline range
and 23.6 percent departing upward or downward for reasons
explicitly set out in the guidelines. 113
Although the majority of sentences fall under the guidelines
range, under the sentencing statute, courts are permitted to
depart upward or downward from sentences prescribed by the

107.
See United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 190 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Unlike
some of our sister circuit courts, we do not presume a Guidelines-range
sentence is reasonable.”).
108.
See United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 213 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010)
(stating that the court “declined [the] invitation” from the Supreme Court to
“presume that a within Guidelines sentence is reasonable”).
109.
See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2008)
(declining to adopt a presumption of reasonableness while “recogniz[ing] that
a correctly calculated Guidelines sentence will normally not be found
unreasonable on appeal”).
110.
See United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 787–88 (11th Cir. 2005)
(per curium) (rejecting the argument that a Guidelines sentence is per se
reasonable but stating that “ordinarily we would expect a sentence within the
Guidelines range to be reasonable”), abrogated on other grounds by Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
111.
See PRIMER: DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES, supra note 66, at 4
(compiling all of the previously cited circuit decisions).
112.
Carty, 520 F.3d at 988.
113.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N QUARTERLY
DATA REP, FOURTH QUARTER RELEASE: PRELIMINARY FISCAL YEAR 2019 DATA,
TABLE 8 (2019).
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guidelines when they find “an aggravating 114 or mitigating 115
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that
prescribed.” 116 Examples of circumstances courts have found not
adequately considered by the guidelines and grounds for
downward departure include a defendant’s being subjected to
severe prison conditions during pre-sentence confinement, 117 a
defendant’s not knowing how pure the methamphetamine he
distributed was, 118 the fact that defendants delivered a large
quantity of narcotic drugs in small amounts over a substantial
period of time rather than at once, 119 an undocumented
114.
See Aggravating Circumstance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019) (defining an aggravating circumstance). The dictionary provides the
following two definitions for “aggravating circumstance”:
1. A fact or situation that increases the degree of liability or
culpability for a criminal act.
2. A fact or situation that relates to a criminal offense or defendant
and that is considered by the court in imposing punishment . . . .
Id.
115.
See Mitigating Circumstance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019) (defining a mitigating circumstance). The dictionary provides the
following two definitions for “mitigating circumstance”:
1. A fact or situation that does not justify or excuse a wrongful act
or offense but that reduces the degree of culpability and thus may
reduce the damages (in a civil case) or the punishment (in a
criminal case).
2. A fact or situation that does not bear on the question of a
defendant’s guilt but that may bear on a court’s possibly lessening
the severity of its judgment.
Id.
116.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2018).
117.
See United States v. Carty, 264 F.3d 191, 196 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding
that the severe prison conditions defendant experienced in the Dominican
Republic while awaiting extradition could serve as a basis for a downward
departure).
118.
See United States v. Mendoza, 121 F.3d 510, 513 (9th Cir. 1997)
(remanding defendant’s case for sentencing because the district court erred in
concluding that it lacked the power to depart from the guidelines on the basis
that defendant did not know or have control over how pure the
methamphetamine was that he was delivering as a middle man).
119.
See United States v. Lara, 47 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming the
district court’s decision to grant downward departure for defendant based on
“quantity/time factor” not adequately considered by the guidelines).
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immigrant serving time in state custody before going into
and
a
defendant’s
post-offense
federal
custody, 120
121
rehabilitation. The Sentencing Commission collects extensive
data on courts’ departures and variances from guidelines-range
sentences, organized by circuit, reason, and degree of
departure. 122
When considering whether a circumstance has been
adequately considered by the guidelines, courts are to consider
“only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official
commentary of the Sentencing Commission.” 123 Again, the
Commission has made clear that in “unusual” cases, it “does not
intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned
anywhere else in the guidelines, that could constitute grounds
for departure.” 124
III. An Overview of Prison Disciplinary Sanctions
The Federal Bureau of Prisons is responsible for
disciplining inmates who commit prohibited acts. 125 While
incarcerated, inmates may commit a number of prohibited acts
that violate both prison regulations and federal law. Such acts
120.
See United States v. Barerra-Saucedo, 385 F.3d 533, 537 (5th Cir.
2004) (holding that it is “permissible for a sentencing court to grant a
downward departure to an illegal alien for all or part of the time served in
state custody from the time immigration authorities locate the defendant until
he is taken into federal custody”).
121.
See United States v. Chapman, 356 F.3d 843, 847 (8th Cir. 2004)
(“[T]ruly exceptional rehabilitation alone can, in rare cases, support a
downward departure even when the defendant does not accept
responsibility.”).
122.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, INTERACTIVE SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS: DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES, https://isb.ussc.gov
/USSC?userid=USSC_Guest&password=USSC_Guest&toc-section=6]
(last
visited Apr. 30, 2020) (tracking the reasons for which courts issue sentences
outside the guidelines range) [https://perma.cc/Z8CU-92H7?type=image].
123.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2018).
124.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.4(b) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018).
125.
See 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a)(3) (2018) (setting forth the “protection,
instruction, and discipline” of federal inmates as one of the duties of the
Bureau of Prisons); see also 28 C.F.R. § 541.1 (2018) (setting forth the purpose
of the Bureau of Prisons’ inmate discipline program).
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include possessing drugs, assaulting a prison guard, sexually
assaulting a fellow inmate, attempting escape, and committing
arson. 126 Bureau staff are to administer sanctions in a way that
is neither capricious nor retaliatory. 127 Prohibited acts are
divided into four levels of severity:
“greatest,” “high,”
“moderate,” and “low.” 128 The sanctions administered for a
prohibited act depend on its level of severity. 129 For example,
committing a “greatest severity level prohibited act,” such as
rioting, an inmate could forfeit one hundred percent of his
earned statutory good time and be subject to disciplinary
segregation of up to twelve months. 130 In contrast, when an
inmate commits a “high severity level prohibited act,” such as
fighting with another person, the potential penalties are
reduced to forfeiting up to fifty percent of earned statutory good
time and being subject to disciplinary segregation of up to six
months. 131
When an inmate arrives at a federal prison, he or she is
given three documents providing notice of the federal prison’s
inmate discipline program: a Summary of the Inmate Discipline
System, Inmate Rights and Responsibilities, and Prohibited
Acts and Available Sanctions. 132
A. The Disciplinary Process
The disciplinary process begins when a Bureau staff
member witnesses or “reasonably believe[s]” that an inmate
committed a prohibited act. 133 The staff member issues an
126.
See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1–2725 (2018) (setting forth federal
crimes).
127.
See 28 C.F.R. § 541.1 (2018) (setting forth the purpose for the Bureau
of Prison’s inmate discipline programs).
128.
Id. § 541.3.
129.
See id. (outlining different sanctions for the severity level of a
prohibited act).
130.
Id.
131.
Id.
132.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, No. 5270.09, INMATE DISCIPLINE PROGRAM
(2011) (describing the notice each inmate must receive and stating that receipt
of the documents must be noted on the intake screening form and kept in the
inmate’s “central file”).
133.
28 C.F.R. § 541.5 (2018).
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incident report, ordinarily within twenty-four hours. 134 Another
Bureau staff member then investigates the incident. 135 Incident
reports for moderate and low severity prohibited acts may be
resolved informally. 136 If the prohibited act also violates federal
law, the incident will be referred for prosecution. 137
Once a staff investigation is completed, a Unit Discipline
Committee (UDC) reviews the incident report, usually within
five days, and determines if the inmate committed the act
charged and, if so, whether or not the report will be referred to
a Discipline Hearing Officer (DHO) for further review,
depending upon offense seriousness. 138 Greatest and high
severity acts are automatically referred to a DHO. 139 At the Unit
Discipline Hearing, the inmate is given the opportunity to
appear, make a statement, and present evidence upon his
behalf. 140 After the hearing, the UDC will issue any appropriate
sanctions, except for “loss of good conduct sentence credit,
disciplinary segregation, or monetary fines,” which the
Committee does not have the authority to issue. 141 An inmate
gets a written report of the proceedings and also has the right
to appeal. 142
If the UDC has referred the incident to a DHO or if the
incident is of “high” or “greatest” severity, then a DHO conducts
the hearing. 143 During a DHO hearing, an inmate is entitled to
have a staff representative help him. 144 The DHO has the power
to administer any available sanctions, including loss of good
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See PROGRAM STATEMENT: CRIMINAL MATTER REFERRALS, supra note 5
(outlining procedures for “tracking and referring matters for prosecution that
occur in Bureau of Prisons facilities or on Bureau of Prisons property, or
involve Bureau of Prisons staff”).
138.
See 28 C.F.R. § 541.7 (2018) (explaining how Unit Discipline
Committee reviews of federal inmate incident reports work).
139.
Id.
140.
Id.
141.
Id.
142.
Id.
143.
See id. § 541.8 (explaining how Discipline Hearing Officer hearings
work).
144.
Id.
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conduct sentence credit, disciplinary segregation in a special
housing unit or control unit, and monetary fines. 145 After a DHO
hearing, an inmate receives a written report. 146 The inmate may
also appeal the DHO’s actions. 147
B. Deference Given to Prison Disciplinary Sanctions
Prison disciplinary sanctions and regulations are generally
granted deference by courts, as long as they pass constitutional
muster. 148 When a prison regulation “impinges on inmates’
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests.” 149 Four factors are
used to determine the reasonableness of a regulation. 150 First,
there “must be a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put
forward to justify it.” 151 Second, a court should consider whether
there are “alternative means of exercising the right that remain
open to prison inmates.” 152 Third, a court should consider the
“impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional
right . . . on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of
prison resources generally.” 153 Lastly, the court should consider
whether or not there are “ready alternatives.” 154
In addition to challenging the prison regulations
themselves, inmates may challenge the way the regulations

145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Know Your Rights: In Prison-Disciplinary Sanctions and
Punishment,
ACLU,
https://acluidaho.org/sites/default/files/wpsite/wpcontent/uploads/2013/01/kyr_discipline_punishment_rev_jun10.pdf (last visited
Apr. 30, 2020) [hereinafter Know Your Rights] (providing examples of
disciplinary punishment and instructing inmates on how to challenge
disciplinary punishment they have received) [https://perma.cc/GPX5-WH9U].
149.
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81, 89 (1987).
150.
Id. at 89.
151.
Id. (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
152.
Id. at 90.
153.
Id.
154.
Id.
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were imposed in their specific situations. 155 However, inmates
who challenge prison regulations and disciplinary sanctions
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause are
entitled to hearings only when there is a “state-created liberty
interest in freedom from such punishment” and the punishment
“imposes an atypical and significant hardship.” 156 For example,
prisoners can challenge loss of good conduct time, but they
cannot challenge being segregated in a Special Housing Unit,
being deprived of phone or computer privileges, or being
transferred to another prison. 157
C. Double Jeopardy Concerns
It is well established that disciplinary sanctions generally
do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 158 The Double Jeopardy Clause protects “only
against successive criminal trials, and a prison disciplinary
proceeding is not a criminal trial.” 159 As then-Judge Sotomayor
155.
See Know Your Rights, supra note 148 (providing examples of
disciplinary punishment and instructing inmates on how to challenge
disciplinary punishment they have received).
156.
Id.; see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995) (holding that
a defendant’s “segregated confinement did not present the type of atypical,
significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty
interest”).
157.
See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (concluding that
procedural due process applies even when “liberty itself is a statutory creation
of the State,” such as in the case of inmates losing good conduct time).
158.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”); see also United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143,
1144 (3d Cir. 1993) (“We do not believe that the Double Jeopardy Clause was
ever intended to inhibit prison discipline.”); United States v. Rising, 867 F.2d
1255, 1259 (10th Cir. 1989) (“[A]dministrative punishment imposed by prison
officials does not render a subsequent judicial proceeding, criminal in nature,
violative of the double jeopardy clause.”); Kerns v. Parratt, 672 F.2d 690, 691
(8th Cir. 1982) (stating that loss of good time credits based on the violation of
prison disciplinary rules “do not place an offender in jeopardy for the purposes
of the double jeopardy clause”); United States v. Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104, 1106
(3d Cir. 1971) (concluding that the fifteen days defendant spent in segregation
after being found guilty of possessing a knife-like instrument in prison was
“not a bar to subsequent prosecution for the crime in a court of competent
jurisdiction”).
159.
MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, 2 RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 10:37 (5th ed. 2018).
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wrote in a 2005 opinion from the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals:
The line between civil and criminal sanctions is often hard
to draw, and this is nowhere more true than in the context of
prisons, where the punitive character of the environment
may make even purely regulatory sanctions appear punitive
in nature. The need to maintain order, however, is a
legitimate nonpunitive interest if it sometimes requires that
prison officials take action of a punitive character. 160

Still, it is conceivable that a prison disciplinary sanction
could raise Double Jeopardy concerns, so the court has set forth
a test to determine whether Double Jeopardy has been
violated. 161 First, the court is to look at “whether the legislature,
in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either
expressly or impliedly a preference” for labeling the mechanism
as a civil remedy or a criminal penalty. 162 Second, the court is to
look at whether the “statutory scheme is ‘so punitive in either
purpose or effect as to transform what was clearly intended as
a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.’” 163 The court is to
consider seven factors, first set forth in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 164 to determine whether a sanction is “penal
or regulatory in character” 165:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a
punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether
the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether
an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Porter v. Coughlin, 421 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 145.
Id. (quotations omitted).
Id.
See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 164–65 (1963)
(holding that statutes imposing “forfeiture of citizenship” as a punishment for
Americans who leave or remain outside the United States in order to evade
military service are unconstitutional).
165.
Id. at 168.
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excessive in relation
assigned . . . . 166

to

the

alternative

purpose

Although inmates view prison disciplinary sanctions as
punitive, prison disciplinary sanctions are generally “viewed as
civil rather than punitive in nature, having the purpose of
ensuring ‘the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of
prisons.’” 167 One reason for this view is that if prison
disciplinary sanctions were considered punitive in nature,
prison officials would be forced to choose between “internal
discipline and criminal prosecution.” 168 As one state court noted:
Prison officials would be forced to permit conditions inside
the walls to deteriorate, forgoing security, order, safety, and
rehabilitation in the hope that violent inmates would be
brought to trial, convicted, and incarcerated in an institution
with greater security. Alternatively, the prison officials could
impose internal disciplinary sanctions . . . . Should such
action preclude subsequent criminal prosecution, in many
instances, the interest of society as a whole in punishing
infractions of criminal law will be left unprotected. We refuse
to force such a choice on prison officials. 169

IV. Disciplinary Sanctions as Grounds for Departure in
Sentencing: The Circuit Split
The circuit courts are split on whether prison disciplinary
sanctions—such as revocation of visitation privileges,
segregation from other prisoners, being denied telephone and
computer privileges, and loss of good time credits 170—can be
grounds for departure under the sentencing guidelines when an
inmate is being sentenced for an offense he committed while

166.
167.

Id. at 168–69.
MUSHLIN, supra note 159 (quoting Porter v. Coughlin, 421 F.3d 141,
146 (2d Cir. 2005)).
168.
See Commonwealth v. Brooks, 479 A.2d 589, 594 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)
(holding that prison disciplinary sanctions did not violate Double Jeopardy).
169.
Id.
170.
See Know Your Rights, supra note 148 (providing examples of
disciplinary punishment and instructing inmates on how to challenge
disciplinary punishment they have received).
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incarcerated. 171 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has stated
that prison disciplinary sanctions are not grounds for departure
under the guidelines. 172 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
has said that courts may decline to consider disciplinary
sanctions as grounds for departure in sentencing. 173 The Eighth
and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals, in contrast, have stated
that courts may consider prison disciplinary sanctions—in
particular loss of good time credits 174—as grounds for departure
in sentencing. 175

171.
Compare United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1148 (3d Cir. 1993)
(“Loss of good time credits is not a basis for a downward departure.”), and
United States v. Ortiz-Mercado, 464 F. App’x 160, 161 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating
that district court “did not act unreasonably in considering the need to punish
[defendant’s] federal offense separately from administrative sanctions
assessed by prison officials”), with United States v. Petersen, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 30180, at *1, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 1996) (stating that district court had
the “discretion to consider” whether defendant’s losing good time credits took
“his case outside the ‘heartland’ of ‘typical cases’ contemplated by the
Commission” (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 104 (1996))), and
United States v. Whitehorse, 909 F.2d 316, 320 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that
district court “did not err in considering the loss of good time as one of the
aggregate of mitigating factors justifying a downward departure in this case”).
172.
See Newby, 11 F.3d at 1148. (“Loss of good time credits is not a basis
for a downward departure.”).
173.
See Ortiz-Mercado, 464 F. App’x at 161 (stating that district court “did
not act unreasonably in considering the need to punish [defendant’s] federal
offense separately from administrative sanctions assessed by prison officials”).
174.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2018) (stating that prisoners serving a term
of imprisonment of more than one year may receive up to fifty-four days of
credit at the end of each year if the Bureau of Prisons determines that the
“prisoner has displayed exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary
regulations”).
175.
See Petersen, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 30180, at *3 (stating that the
district court had the “discretion to consider” whether defendant’s losing good
time credits took “his case outside the ‘heartland’ of ‘typical cases’
contemplated by the Commission” (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S.
81, 104 (1996))); see also Whitehorse, 909 F.2d at 320 (stating that district
court “did not err in considering the loss of good time as one of the aggregate
of mitigating factors justifying a downward departure in this case”).
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A. Third Circuit: United States v. Newby
In United States v. Newby, 176 the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals considered the appeals of Gene Francis Newby and
Raynaldo Barber, both of whom were convicted for knowingly
and willfully impeding and interfering with a federal prison
guard and one of whom was convicted of assaulting a federal
prison guard. 177 Because they used intoxicants and assaulted
prison guards in violation of prison regulations, Newby and
Barber were disciplinarily transferred and segregated and also
deprived of good time credits—1,000 days for Newby and
fifty-four for Barber. 178 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals first
considered whether defendants’ loss of good time credits
constituted “punishment” under the Double Jeopardy Clause
and concluded that it is well established that prison disciplinary
sanctions do not invoke Double Jeopardy. 179
The court then considered whether defendants’ loss of good
time credits was a mitigating factor not addressed by the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines and warranting downward departure. 180
The court acknowledged that the loss of good time credits was
not explicitly addressed by the U.S. Sentencing Commission,
176.
See United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1144–48 (3d Cir. 1993)
(holding that prison disciplinary sanctions do not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause and that they are not basis for a downward departure).
177.
Id. at 1144.
178.
Id.
179.
See id. at 1146 (“We do not believe that the Double Jeopardy Clause
was ever intended to inhibit prison discipline.”); see also United States v.
Rising, 867 F.2d 1255, 1259 (10th Cir. 1989) (“[A]dministrative punishment
imposed by prison officials does not render a subsequent judicial proceeding,
criminal in nature, violative of the double jeopardy clause.”); Kerns v. Parratt,
672 F.2d 690, 691 (8th Cir. 1982) (stating that loss of good time credits based
on the violation of prison disciplinary rules “do not place an offender in
jeopardy for the purposes of the double jeopardy clause”); United States v.
Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104, 1106 (3d Cir. 1971) (concluding that the fifteen days
defendant spent in segregation after being found guilty of possessing a
knife-like instrument in prison was “not a bar to subsequent prosecution for
the crime in a court of competent jurisdiction”).
180.
See Newby, 11 F.3d at 1148 (“A sentencing court has the power to
depart downward only when it is faced with a mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelines.”).
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but it concluded that a prison disciplinary sanction for loss of
good time credits was not a mitigating circumstance under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b). 181 “The gravamen of a mitigating
circumstance,” said the court, “is that it somehow reduces the
defendant’s guilt or culpability.” 182 The court reasoned that loss
of good time credits do not relate to defendants’ guilt and that
“being sanctioned administratively does not show that
[defendants] were morally less culpable of the charged crime.” 183
“Loss of good time credits,” the court stated, “is not a basis for a
downward departure.” 184 The court reasoned that granting a
downward departure because defendants had received prison
disciplinary sanctions “would defeat the very goals of our
criminal justice system,” giving defendants a “lesser sentence
than their respective crimes justly deserve.” 185
A year later, in United States v. Monaco, 186 the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals clarified its holding in Newby, stating
that its “pronouncement on moral culpability . . . must be
considered dictum” 187 in order to reconcile Newby with United
States v. Gaskill 188 and United States v. Lieberman, 189 two
earlier decisions in which the court granted downward
departures for circumstances that did not lower the defendants’

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1148–49.
See United States v. Monaco, 23 F.3d 793, 799–801 (3d Cir. 1994)
(holding that downward departures were permissible on the bases of
overstatement of criminality by loss tables and anguish over involving adult
son in fraudulent scheme).
187.
Id. at 803; see also United States v. Evans, 49 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir.
1995) (stating that the “government’s reliance on Newby is misplaced” and
that a mitigating circumstance does not necessarily need to lessen defendant’s
guilt).
188.
See United States v. Gaskill, 991 F.2d 82, 86 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding
that defendant’s responsibility to care for his mentally ill spouse could be
grounds for a downward departure).
189.
See United States v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989, 998 (3d Cir. 1992)
(holding that downward departure was appropriate because the prosecution
had manipulated defendant’s indictment to make it possible to charge him for
two offenses under the guidelines).
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culpability. 190 “[R]educed moral culpability,” said the court, “is
not the only permissible basis for a downward departure.” 191
The court’s conclusion in Monaco, however, did not overrule
Newby. 192 Under Monaco, Newby’s holding—that loss of good
time credits is not a mitigating factor warranting downward
departure—stands. 193 The court focused on Newby’s reasoning
that good time credits do not warrant downward departure
because of the different purposes prison disciplinary sanctions
and criminal sentences serve. 194 “[M]erely because a prisoner
faces the prison’s administrative penalties for rule infractions,”
said the court, “he cannot thereby accrue a mitigating benefit in
a criminal sentence flowing from the same act or acts.” 195
B. Fourth Circuit: United States v. Ortiz-Mercado
In United States v. Ortiz-Mercado, 196 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals heard the appeal of Heriberto Ortiz-Mercado,
a North Carolina inmate who pled guilty to possession of
contraband (a cellular phone, which a guard found in the pocket
of a pair of his shorts) and was sentenced by the district court to
two months in prison, to run consecutively with the sentence he
was serving at the time of the incident. 197 On appeal,
Ortiz-Mercado argued that his sentence was “substantively
unreasonable,” in part because he had received prison
disciplinary sanctions from the Bureau of Prisons for possessing
190.
See Monaco, 23 F.3d at 803 (“Thus, to the extent that Newby’s
pronouncement on moral culpability can be read to implicitly overrule
decisions such as Gaskill and Lieberman, the Newby language must be
considered dictum.”).
191.
Id. at 802.
192.
See id. at 802–03 (distinguishing Monaco from Newby).
193.
See id. (explaining that the court’s holding in Newby must be read in
harmony with the courts’ decisions in Gaskill and Lieberman).
194.
See id. at 802 (“We held [in Newby] that because criminal sentences
and disciplinary sanctions are designed to serve different purposes, such a
departure would defeat the goals of the criminal justice system by giving
incarcerated defendants lesser sentences than they deserved.”).
195.
Id.
196.
United States v. Ortiz-Mercado, 464 F. App’x 160, 161 (4th Cir. 2012)
(holding that defendant’s sentence was substantively reasonable).
197.
Id.
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the contraband. 198 As a result of having a prohibited object,
Ortiz-Mercado lost good time credits, telephone privileges for
eighteen months, and commissary privileges for twelve
months. 199 In addition, Ortiz-Mercado was placed in solitary
confinement for eight months. 200 The Court concluded that the
district court “did not act unreasonably in considering the need
to punish Ortiz-Mercado’s federal offense separately from
administrative sanctions assessed by prison officials” but did
not explicitly say that prison disciplinary sanctions could never
be considered as grounds for downward departure. 201
C. Eighth Circuit: United States v. Whitehorse
In United States v. Whitehorse, 202 the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals heard the appeal of Karen Jane Whitehorse, a North
Dakota inmate serving a three-year sentence on an assault
conviction. 203 While serving her sentence, Whitehorse, an
alcoholic, was granted a seven-day furlough to visit relatives. 204
Instead of visiting her relatives, she spent the week’s furlough
intoxicated and then did not have enough money to return to
her correctional center at the appointed time. 205 She did,
however, call the correctional center and tell them about the
situation. 206 The Bureau of Prisons extended her furlough, and
she still failed to appear. 207 She was arrested and charged with
escape. 208

198.
Brief for Appellant at 5, United States v. Ortiz-Mercado, 464 F. App’x
160 (4th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-4661).
199.
Id. at 6–7.
200.
Id. at 7.
201.
Ortiz-Mercado, 464 F. App’x at 161.
202.
See United States v. Whitehorse, 909 F.2d 316, 320 (8th Cir. 1990)
(holding that the district court properly considered defendant’s loss of good
time as a mitigating circumstance and that the “totality of the mitigating
factors” the district court considered “warranted downward departure”).
203.
Id. at 317–18.
204.
Id. at 317.
205.
Id.
206.
Id.
207.
Id.
208.
Id.
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The
district
court
departed
from
the
guidelines-recommended range of twelve to eighteen months, to
be served consecutively, and sentenced Whitehorse to a
four-month sentence, which she could serve concurrently with
the three-year sentence she was already serving. 209 On appeal
from the government, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed whether there were mitigating circumstances
inadequately considered by the guidelines warranting
departure in Whitehorse’s case and whether the district court
abused its discretion in imposing a four-month sentence. 210 The
Court found that there were mitigating factors—one of which
was Whitehorse’s loss of two months of good conduct time—that
warranted downward departure. 211 The court stated: “We hold
that the District Court did not err in considering the loss of good
time as one of the aggregate of mitigating factors justifying a
downward departure in this case.” 212
D. Ninth Circuit: United States v. Petersen
In United States v. Petersen, 213 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals heard the appeal of Donald W. Petersen, an inmate who
sent a “barrage of threatening letters” to two of his former
college professors, one of whom was the victim of the assault for
which Petersen was serving a seventy-five-month sentence. 214
The state Department of Corrections sanctioned him with the
loss of 360 days of good time credits, and Petersen was also
charged by the federal government with two counts of mailing
threatening letters. 215 The district court that initially heard
Petersen’s case held that it did not have “discretion to consider
[Petersen’s] loss of good time credits . . . as bases for departing
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 319–20.
Id. at 320.
See United States v. Petersen, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 30180, at *1, *4
(9th Cir. Nov. 18, 1996) (holding that the district court had discretion to
consider whether defendant’s loss of good time credits took his case out of the
“heartland” of cases and were therefore grounds for a downward departure).
214.
Id. at *2.
215.
Id.
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from the Sentencing Guidelines.” 216 After the district court’s
ruling, however, the Supreme Court held in Koon v. United
States 217 that district courts have the discretion to consider any
factors not “categorically proscribed by the Sentencing
Commission” as bases for departure. 218 Because good time
credits had not been addressed by the Sentencing Commission,
the Court of Appeals held that the district court that considered
Petersen’s case had the discretion to consider whether the loss
of good time credits took Petersen’s case “outside the ‘heartland’
of ‘typical’ cases contemplated by the Commission.” 219
V. Why the Third Circuit Court of Appeals Got It Wrong
in Newby
As stated above, there are two types of departure allowed
for under the guidelines: departures for which the guidelines
“provide specific guidance . . . by analogy or by other numerical
or non-numerical suggestions” and “unguided” departures. 220 It
is clear that prison disciplinary sanctions have not been
explicitly covered by the guidelines, nor have related terms such
as “administrative sanctions” and “good time credits.” 221 The
question on which the Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits
disagree is whether prison disciplinary sanctions can be
considered as grounds for departure under the second type of
216.
217.

Id.
See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 109 (1996) (concluding that
whether a factor can be an appropriate basis for departure is “limited to
determining whether the Commission has proscribed, as a categorical matter,
consideration of the factor” and whether the factor “takes the case outside the
heartland of the applicable Guideline”), superseded by the Prosecutorial
Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of
2003 (PROTECT Act). The PROTECT Act changed the standard of review
appellate courts apply to district courts’ departure decisions from “abuse of
discretion” to de novo for violent crimes involving children.
218.
Petersen, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 30180, at *3.
219.
Id. at *4 (quoting Koon, 518 U.S. at 92–99).
220.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.4(b) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018).
221.
See generally id. (showing neither “good time credits” nor
“administrative sanctions” nor “prison disciplinary sanctions” when the terms
were searched in the guidelines).
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departures—“unguided” departures. 222 The Third Circuit in
Newby said that prison disciplinary sanctions, such as the loss
of good time credits, could not be considered as an “unguided”
departure. 223 Acknowledging that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) allows for
departure when a court “finds that there exists an aggravating
or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission,” 224 the Third Circuit concluded that prison
disciplinary sanctions could not be such a mitigating
circumstance because of the “different purposes that the
disciplinary sanctions and criminal sentences are designed
serve . . . .” 225 “[G]ranting a downward departure to compensate
for the defendants’ loss of good time credits,” said the court,
“would defeat the very goals of our criminal justice system.” 226
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Newby got it wrong.
The statutory provision instructing courts on how to apply the
guidelines gives courts broad discretion to depart from
guideline-specific sentences when they find “an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence
different from that described.” 227 The guidelines are clear that
they are meant to create a “heartland” of cases, a “set of typical
cases embodying the conduct that each guideline describes.” 228
With a few exceptions, the Commission says that it “does not
intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned
anywhere else in the guidelines, that could constitute grounds
for departure in an unusual case.” 229 The factors that cannot be
considered include “race, sex, national origin, creed, religion,

222.
223.

See cases cited supra note 171.
See United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1148 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Loss
of good time credits is not a basis for a downward departure.”).
224.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2018).
225.
Newby, 11 F.3d at 1148.
226.
Id.
227.
§ 3553(b)(1).
228.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §1A1.4(b) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018).
229.
Id.
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and socio-economic status,” 230 “lack of guidance as a youth and
similar circumstances,” 231 “drug or alcohol dependence or abuse”
(ordinarily), 232 and “personal financial difficulties and economic
pressures upon a trade or business.” 233
Even though prison disciplinary sanctions and criminal
sentences serve different purposes, it may be appropriate in
some cases for judges to consider prison disciplinary sanctions—
particularly severe sanctions, such as solitary confinement and
loss of a large amount of good conduct time—as grounds for
downward departure. Beyond the above-listed exceptions, the
Commission has been clear that it “does not intend to limit the
kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned anywhere else in the
guidelines, that could constitute grounds for departure in an
unusual case.” 234 The Sentencing Commission tracks the
reasons courts list for departing from the guidelines, and the
reasons are myriad. 235 In FY2017, for example, courts cited the
following reasons for departing from the guidelines: family ties
and responsibilities, age, physical condition, time served,
cultural assimilation, low likelihood of recidivism, charitable
conduct and good works, military record, crack/powder
disparity, and sufficient punishment. 236 Although it may be
unlikely for judges to depart from the guidelines on the basis of
a defendant’s receiving prison disciplinary sanctions, given the
deference these sanctions are usually afforded 237 and the fact

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. § 5H1.10.
Id. § 5H1.12.
Id. § 5H1.4.
Id. § 5K2.12.
Id. §1A1.4(b).
See INTERACTIVE SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS:
DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES, supra note 122 (tracking the reasons for which
courts issue sentences outside the guidelines range).
236.
See REASONS GIVEN BY SENTENCING COURTS FOR DOWNWARD
DEPARTURES FROM THE GUIDELINE RANGE, supra note 72 (compiling the reasons
for which sentencing courts have stated they are departing from the guidelines
range).
237.
See Know Your Rights, supra note 148 (providing examples of
disciplinary punishment and instructing inmates on how to challenge
disciplinary punishment they have received).
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that they are not mentioned in the guidelines, 238 there is no
reason that a court could not consider prison disciplinary
sanctions as a possible grounds for departure.
VI. Whether Courts Should Consider Prison Disciplinary
Sanctions as Grounds for Downward Departure: A Policy
Analysis
Courts may consider prison disciplinary sanctions as
grounds for downward departure under the guidelines. 239 But
should they? This Part will consider the reasons for and against
judges’ departing downward from the guidelines because an
inmate has received prison disciplinary sanctions. It will then
recommend that the guidelines be explicitly amended to
“provide specific guidance” to courts for departing downward on
the basis of prison disciplinary sanctions, given the circuit split.
Lastly, it will provide an overview of the guidelines’ amendment
process.
A. Reasons Against Prison Disciplinary Sanctions Being Used
as Grounds for Downward Departure
While courts can consider prison disciplinary sanctions as
grounds for departure (as well as grounds for variance), there
are a number of reasons they may decline to do so. As the court
in Newby noted, prison disciplinary sanctions serve a different
purpose than sentences. 240 Sentences are meant to
238.
See generally, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (showing neither “good time credits” nor
“administrative sanctions” nor “prison disciplinary sanctions” when the terms
were searched in the guidelines).
239.
See id. § 1A1.4(b) (stating “[w]ith those specific exceptions, however,
the Commission does not intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether or not
mentioned anywhere else in the guidelines, that could constitute grounds for
departure in an unusual case” and not listing “disciplinary sanctions” as an
exception).
240.
See United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1148 (1993) (“Because of
the different purposes that the disciplinary sanctions and criminal sentences
are designed to serve, we think that granting a downward departure to
compensate for the defendants’ loss of good time credits would defeat the very
goals of our criminal justice system.”).
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(a) reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (b)
to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (c) to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(d) to provide the defendant with needed educational and
vocational training, medical care, and other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner . . . . 241

In contrast, prison disciplinary sanctions are meant to
“ensure the safety, security, and orderly operation of
correctional facilities, and the protection of the public . . . .” 242 A
sentence is punitive in nature, whereas a prison disciplinary
sanction is primarily administrative.
When an inmate commits a crime in prison, he has notice
that he will be subject to both types of sanctions, and his actions
may merit both types of sanctions. 243 The sentencing guidelines
state that “a defendant with a prior criminal record is more
culpable than a first offender and thus deserving of greater
punishment.” 244 The guidelines instruct that two points should
be added to a defendant’s criminal history category when the
defendant “committed the instant offense while under any
criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole,
supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape
status.” 245 The guidelines take it seriously when an inmate has
committed an additional offense while serving time for a
previously committed offense. 246 If an inmate is indeed “more
culpable,” it makes sense that he would receive both prison
disciplinary sanctions for committing an act prohibited by the
prison and also receive a criminal sentence. 247
241.
242.
243.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2018).
28 C.F.R. § 541.1 (2018).
See INMATE DISCIPLINE PROGRAM, supra note 132 (describing the
notice each inmate must receive and stating that receipt of the documents
must be noted on the intake screening form and kept in the inmate’s “central
file”); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1–2725 (2018) (setting forth federal crimes).
244.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2018) (emphasis added).
245.
Id. § 4A1.1(d).
246.
See id. (specifying that two points should be added).
247.
See id. at pt. A, introductory cmt. (“A defendant with a record of prior
criminal behavior is more culpable than a first offender and thus deserving of
greater punishment.”).
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On a practical level, if judges begin to depart based upon
prison disciplinary sanctions, it may lead them to begin
departing for other non-criminal sanctions administered by the
state or federal government, too, for example, sex offender
registration. 248 Lastly, if judges begin to frequently depart
because of prison disciplinary sanctions, the Bureau of Prisons
could simply decide to discipline inmates after the court
sentences them in order to avoid the issue, as the timeline for
the prison disciplinary process is malleable. While the Bureau
of Prisons would likely not do this with sanctions that ensure
the “orderly operation of correctional facilities,” it is possible
that they would do so with sanctions such as loss of good time
conduct. 249
B. Reasons for Prison Disciplinary Sanctions Being Used as
Grounds for Downward Departure
The guidelines instruct that the Commission “does not
intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned
anywhere else in the guidelines, that could constitute grounds
for departure.” 250 Courts are also required under 18 U.S.C. §
3553 to “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes [of sentencing].” 251
While the guidelines were instituted in order to make the
federal sentencing system more proportional and consistent, 252
they are also meant to provide “sufficient flexibility to permit
individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or
aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment
of general sentencing practices.” 253
248.
See, e.g., 34 U.S.C. § 20912 (2018) (stating that “[e]ach jurisdiction
shall maintain a jurisdiction-wide sex offender registry” and “[t]he Attorney
General shall issue guidelines and regulations”).
249.
28 C.F.R. § 541.1 (2018).
250.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §1A1(b) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018) (explaining the reasons for the Commission’s departure policy
and the kinds of departures to which the guidelines refer).
251.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
252.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.2 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018) (setting forth the statutory mission of the U.S. Sentencing
Commission).
253.
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2018).
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Given the different purposes of prison disciplinary
sanctions and criminal sentences, it is unlikely that judges will
frequently depart from the guidelines based upon prison
disciplinary sanctions. 254 When judges see fit to depart based
upon prison disciplinary sanctions, however, they should do so,
as they are to do justice on a case-by-case basis, even under the
guidelines. 255 Achieving “equal justice across cases” and
“individual justice in specific cases” is a difficult task,
however. 256 Critics of the guidelines put it this way:
By replacing the case-by-case exercise of human judgment
with a mechanical calculus, we do not judge better or more
objectively, nor do we judge worse. Instead we cease to judge
at all. We process individuals according to a variety of
purportedly objective criteria. But genuine judgment, in the
sense of moral reckoning, cannot be inscribed in a table of
offense levels and criminal history categories . . . . In place of
moral judgment, the Guidelines have substituted
bureaucratic penalization. 257

In some cases, such as the hypothetical case of James at the
beginning of the Note, a judge may find that justice requires
downward departure because the defendant has received prison
disciplinary sanctions. 258 Being able to depart on this basis gives
the judge the opportunity to do individual justice. Further,
granting downward departures on the basis of prison
254.
See REASONS GIVEN BY SENTENCING COURTS FOR DOWNWARD
DEPARTURES FROM THE GUIDELINE RANGE, supra note 72 (indicating that in
FY2017, no sentencing courts cited prison disciplinary sanctions as a reason
for downward departure).
255.
See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (stating that the guidelines are to
“provide certainty and fairness” while also “maintaining sufficient flexibility
to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or
aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general
sentencing practices”).
256.
See Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1247, 1253–54 (1997) (discussing the
unintended consequences of the federal sentencing guidelines).
257.
Id.
258.
See id. at 1263 (warning that by eliminating the power of judges to
consider the circumstances of a crime and the defendant in their entirety “the
Guidelines threaten to transform the venerable ritual of sentencing into a
puppet theater in which defendants are not persons, but kinds of persons”).
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disciplinary sanctions is consistent with many of the other
reasons judges have given for granting downward departure in
order to do individual justice, such as “rehabilitation,”
“convictions
on
related
counts,”
“totality
of
circumstances/combination of factors,” “sufficient punishment,”
and the fact that the defendant is “currently receiving
punishment under state or federal jurisdiction.” 259
It is well established that prison disciplinary sanctions do
not invoke Double Jeopardy concerns. 260 While that is true, a
defendant’s receiving prison disciplinary sanctions and a
criminal sentence may sometimes invoke some of the same
philosophical concerns as Double Jeopardy, i.e., that a person
should not be punished twice. As then-Judge Sotomayor wrote:
“The line between civil and criminal sanctions is often hard to
draw, and this is nowhere more true than in the context of
prisons, where the punitive character of the environment may
make even purely regulatory sanctions appear punitive in
nature.” 261 While prison disciplinary sanctions do not invoke
Double Jeopardy concerns, there are likely situations in which
disciplinary sanctions are so punitive (i.e., solitary confinement
or loss of an exorbitant amount of good conduct time) that what
the defendant actually experiences is double punishment.
Further, the guidelines add criminal history points when the
defendant “committed the instant offense while under any
259.
REASONS GIVEN BY SENTENCING COURTS FOR DOWNWARD DEPARTURES
FROM THE GUIDELINE RANGE, supra note 72.
260.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . twice put in

jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”); United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1144 (3d
Cir. 1993) (“We do not believe that the Double Jeopardy Clause was ever
intended to inhibit prison discipline.”); United States v. Rising, 867 F.2d 1255,
1259 (10th Cir. 1989) (“Administrative punishment imposed by prison officials
does not render a subsequent judicial proceeding, criminal in nature, violative
of the double jeopardy clause.”); Kerns v. Parratt, 672 F.2d 690, 691 (8th Cir.
1982) (stating that loss of good time credits based on the violation of prison
disciplinary rules “do not place an offender in jeopardy for the purposes of the
double jeopardy clause”); United States v. Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104, 1106 (3d
Cir. 1971) (concluding that the fifteen days defendant spent in segregation
after being found guilty of possessing a knife-like instrument in prison was
“not a bar to subsequent prosecution for the crime in a court of competent
jurisdiction”).
261.
Porter v. Coughlin, 421 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2005).
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criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole,
supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape
status,” which is, in a way, an additional punitive measure. 262
Allowing judges to depart from the guidelines on the basis of
prison disciplinary sanctions will allow them to soften an
unusually harsh prison disciplinary sanction when merited.
Under § 3553, sentencing courts are instructed to consider
the “need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness
of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense,” as well as the need “to afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.” 263 It is possible that
the prison disciplinary sanctions imposed by the Bureau of
Prisons have satisfied these purposes and that if a departure is
not warranted, a variance under § 3553 would be.
C. The Guidelines’ Amendment Process
From the very beginning, the guidelines were meant to be
“evolutionary.” 264 When it first published the guidelines, the
Commission stated:
The initial sentencing guidelines and policy statements were
developed after extensive hearings, deliberation, and
consideration of substantial public comment. The
Commission emphasizes, however, that it views the
Guideline-writing process as evolutionary. It expects, and
the governing statute anticipates, that continuing research,
experience, and analysis will result in modifications and
revisions to the [G]uidelines through submission of
amendments to Congress. To this end, the Commission is
established as a permanent agency to monitor sentencing
practices in the federal courts. 265

262.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1(d) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018).
263.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018).
264.
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 1A1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (setting forth the statutory
mission of the U.S. Sentencing Commission).
265.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018).
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The guidelines evolve by way of amendments, based upon
“congressional action, decisions from courts of appeals,
sentencing-related research, and input from the criminal justice
community.” 266 The Commission amends the guidelines
annually. 267 Each summer, the Commission publishes a notice
of proposed priorities in the Federal Register and makes a
request for public comment. 268 In the fall, the Commission
finalizes its priorities. 269 Generally in December or January, the
Commission publishes its proposed amendments in the Federal
Register and, again, requests public comment and hosts public
hearings. 270 By the first day of May, “at or after the beginning
of a regular session of Congress,” the Commission submits its
proposed amendments to Congress, along with a statement of
reasons and proposed dates of effect for the amendments. 271 A
date of effect must be at least 180 days after the amendment
was submitted—to give Congress time to disapprove or modify
the amendment if it chooses to do so—but before November 1. 272
Generally, amendments take effect on November 1. 273 A new

266.
See Amendments to the Guidelines Manual, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION,
https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/amendments (last visited Apr. 30, 2020)
(archiving the yearly amendments and guidelines manuals dating back to
1987) [https://perma.cc/8KEA-J9B4].
267.
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2018) (setting forth amending the guidelines
as one of the duties of the Commission and explaining the process).
268.
See Policymaking, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, https://www.ussc.gov
/policymaking (last visited Apr. 30, 2020) (providing an overview of the
amendment process) [https://perma.cc/62PW-GMVK].
269.
See id. (providing a general timeline of the commission’s
policymaking process in which proposals are finalized from September to
December).
270.
See Policymaking, supra note 268 (“Typically in January (but
sometimes earlier) the Commission publishes proposed amendments
responding to its list of priorities.”); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018) (setting forth
the procedures for agency rulemaking under the Administrative Procedures
Act).
271.
28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2018).
272.
See id. (detailing the timeline for submitting amendments to the
guidelines).
273.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, r.
4.1 (2016) (setting forth the process for the promulgation of guidelines
amendments).
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manual is published each time the guidelines are amended. 274
Since they were first published in 1987, the Sentencing
Commission has passed over 800 amendments to the
guidelines. 275
One of the final priorities for the last amendment cycle—
which ended on May 1, 2019—was “resolution of circuit conflicts
as warranted, pursuant to the Commission’s authority under 28
U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) 276 and Braxton v. United States, 277 500
U.S. 334 (1991).” 278 The statutory provision instructs that one of
the purposes of the Commission is to
provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of
sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining
sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when
warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken
into account in the establishment of general sentencing
practices. 279

In Braxton, the Court considered whether it is the duty of
the Supreme Court or the Sentencing Commission to resolve
conflicts between federal courts regarding the meaning of
provisions in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. 280 The Court
explained that while one of the Court’s principal purposes is to
274.
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2018) (setting forth amending the guidelines
as one of the duties of the Commission and explaining the process).
275.
See Policymaking, supra note 268 (providing an overview of the
amendment process).
276.
See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2018) (describing the characteristics of
the “sentencing policies and practices” the U.S. Sentencing Commission are to
implement).
277.
See Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 334, 348–49 (1991) (declining
to resolve question relating to circuit conflict because the “[U.S. Sentencing]
Commission has already undertaken a proceeding that will eliminate circuit
conflict” and because the controversy could be decided upon other grounds).
278.
Final Priorities for Amendment Cycle for United States Sentencing
Commission, 83 Fed. Reg. 30,477 (June 28, 2018).
279.
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2018).
280.
See Braxton, 500 U.S. at 348–49 (declining to resolve question
relating to circuit conflict because the “[U.S. Sentencing] Commission has
already undertaken a proceeding that will eliminate circuit conflict” and
because the controversy could be decided upon other grounds).
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“resolve conflicts among the United States courts of appeals and
state courts concerning the meaning of provisions of federal
law,” Congress and agencies also share that duty, as they can
clarify statutory provisions and regulations. 281 In respect to the
guidelines, the Court stated that by charging the Commission
to “periodically review and revise” the guidelines, “Congress
necessarily contemplated that the Commission would
periodically review the work of the courts, and would make
whatever clarifying revisions to the guidelines conflicting
judicial decisions might suggest.” 282
In the last cycle of proposed amendments, one of the
amendments related to a circuit conflict regarding the
application of § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) and whether under that
provision courts can “reduce a sentence below the amended
guideline range to reflect departures other than substantial
assistance that the defendant received at his original sentencing
or whether any sentence reduction may reflect only the
departure amount attributable to substantial assistance.” 283
Reviewing the work of the courts is one of the duties of the
Commission. 284 It would be appropriate for the Commission to
review the circuit conflict over whether prison disciplinary
sanctions can be grounds for downward departure.
VII. Conclusion
Given the conflict between the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals and the Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeals, 285 the guidelines should be amended to “provide
specific guidance” 286 to courts about departing downward on the
basis of prison disciplinary sanctions. Amending the guidelines
281.
282.
283.

Id. at 347.
Id. at 348 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(o)).
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
SENTENCING GUIDELINES (2018).
284.
See Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 334, 348–49 (1991) (“Congress
necessarily contemplated that the Commission would periodically review the
work of the courts, and would make whatever clarifying revisions to the
[G]uidelines conflicting judicial decisions might suggest.”).
285.
See cases cited supra note 171.
286.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.4(b) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018).
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would provide clear guidance to federal inmates, Bureau of
Prisons staff, courts, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. As
prosecuting or defending federal inmates for the federal crimes
they commit in prison is not a significant part of any attorney’s
practice, this kind of certainty and consistency would be helpful.
It would, for example, make it easier for prosecutors and defense
attorneys to negotiate plea agreements, as they would know
more fully what factors the federal district judge is considering
in sentencing. Take, for example, the case of James, told at the
beginning of this Note. If the U.S. Attorney prosecuting that
case had known that the judge might depart based upon James’s
prison disciplinary sanctions, he could have negotiated James’s
plea agreement accordingly. If James’s defense attorney had
known that the judge might consider prison disciplinary
sanctions, he could have used it to his advantage in the
negotiating process, as well. If James had not plead guilty and
had gone to trial instead, his defense attorney could have made
the case for the prison disciplinary sanctions being grounds for
departure. The U.S. Sentencing Commission can provide clear
guidance in this area over which the circuits are conflicted—and
it should.

